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I. INTRODUCTION
An enduring duality continues to define the debate over how to pay for American
health care. On one side stands the traditional American ideals of individuality and
personal autonomy; these strong cultural values support the idea that our
accomplishments, including our ability to pay for our own health care, should reflect
personal effort rather than the benefits of a charity state.1 On the other side stands
the evolving belief that health care represents a “public good.”2 As such, the need
for health care may be considered a basic need, like food or shelter, and there may
even exist an innate right to such care.
In many ways, our current system of private commercial insurance epitomizes
these ideals of individuality and personal accomplishment. Private insurance
policies are acquired either as part of an employment package or purchased from a
private insurer at personal cost.3 Whether structured along managed care lines or

*
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1

See Philip Lee, Politics, Health Policy, and the American Character, 17 STAN. L. &
POL’Y REV. 7, 8, 9-13 (2006) (arguing that Americans rely on market forces to reflect personal
responsibility and individual effort, that the growing political polarization we are witnessing
results from this continuing dichotomy between personal independence and shared societal
merit, and that this move towards a more conservative philosophy of personal autonomy “is
the impetus for a series of public policy initiatives that may further exacerbate existing social
inequalities”).
2

Id. at 16.

3
See CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2005, 20 (2006),
http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/p60-231.pdf (“Census Bureau broadly classifies health
insurance coverage as private coverage or government coverage. Private health insurance is a
plan provided through an employer or a union or purchased by an individual from a private
company. Government health insurance includes the federal programs Medicare, Medicaid,
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traditional fee-for-service, these policies generally delineate with care a list of
supported services for which the policy will pay. The policy may only partially
cover the cost of a particular treatment in which case the remaining costs incurred
become the responsibility of the individual.
In contrast, Medicare was born in the era of President Lyndon B. Johnson’s
“Great Society.”4 Its passage marked a commitment to the idea that ensuring
adequate health care for the American populace was more an issue of societal merit
than personal economic resourcefulness. Even so, that commitment was far from
unanimous and the birth of Medicare also marked the beginning of an enduring and
public debate over health care as a matter of social justice or market economics.5
Increasingly, the question of continuing national health care coverage would turn on
whether health care constituted a public good “differentiated by society for its own
highest purposes, not a business to be exploited” or a matter of market economics, to
be shaped by “the fundamentals of our political economy – capitalistic, pluralistic,
and competitive.”6
Both systems struggle to cope with rising health care costs today. The cost of
private insurance has placed it outside the reach of many individuals.7 Rising
premiums have also made it impossible for many small corporations to continue to
offer employer-sponsored health insurance which has resulted in a steady increase in
the number of uninsured Americans since 2000.8 Furthermore, recent studies
suggest that uninsured Americans who later become eligible for Medicare benefits
often incur greater health care costs than those who had been insured prior to
attaining Medicare coverage status.9 Approximately forty-seven million Americans
and military health care; the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP); and
individual state health plans”).
4

See Charlotte Twight, Medicare’s Origin: The Economics and Politics of Dependency, 16
CATO J. 309, 313 (1997) (“Medicare’s passage was anything but a spontaneous societal
embrace of one of the pillars of President Lyndon Johnson’s ‘Great Society’.”).
5

Lee, supra note 1, at 16-17.

6

Id. at 16, 18.

7

See CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, THE NUMBER OF UNINSURED AMERICANS
CONTINUED TO RISE IN 2004, (2005), http://www.cbpp.org/8-30-05health.htm (stating that, in
addition to a reduction in the percentage of individuals with employer-sponsored health
insurance plans, “there are signs that private coverage is weakening for those who have
coverage,” that “[a] recent survey found that more than one-third of adults have problems
paying medical bills and encounter related problems of access to care,” and that both the
uninsured as well as insured individuals with high deductibles are more likely to encounter
problems when attempting to obtain and afford necessary health care)[hereinafter CBPP].
8
See NATIONAL COALITION ON HEALTH CARE, FACTS ON HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE
(2007), http://www.nchc.org/facts/coverage_fact_sheet_2007.pdf (reporting a steady increase
in the number of uninsured Americans since 2000 primarily as a result of decreasing numbers
of employer-sponsored health plans and noting an increased likelihood of health care
insurance coverage with increasing income).
9

See Ed Edelson, Uninsured Americans Raise Medicare Expenditures, HEALTHDAY
REPORTER (July 11, 2007), available at http://www.covenanthealth.org/healthday/7_2007/606
311 (stating that “Americans who weren’t insured before they reached age sixty-five and
gained access to Medicare cost the program a lot more than those who did have health
insurance” with thirteen percent more physician visits, twenty percent more hospitalizations,
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went without health care insurance coverage in 2005.10 Another sixteen million
Americans had insufficient health care insurance coverage.11
Similarly, the escalating cost of Medicare expenditures has become legendary.
Current Medicare costs total approximately $374 billion, which is equivalent to
fourteen percent of the federal budget.12 Medicare costs are expected to escalate to
$524 billion by 2011.13
The trend in coping with these rising Medicare costs has been to increase the role
that private insurance plays in providing coverage for Medicare recipients. Much of
this movement towards an increased “privatization” of Medicare has been born of
the belief that the private sector of health care insurance coverage has been made
more efficient by existing market forces and will provide a way to both continue
providing health care to elderly Americans while containing Medicare costs through
these increased efficiencies as exemplified through the managed care model.
This premise will be further explored in this article. First, this article will review
an abbreviated history of private sector managed care as well as the origins of
Medicare. Second, it will review the basic structure of the Medicare Modernization
Act of 2003 (MMA) as it was first introduced and discuss how the MMA continues
to evolve in the face of escalating health care demands. Finally, it will address how
the MMA seeks to ration health care within the Medicare system and how such
rationing has proven problematic in the private sector as well as discussing some of
the troubling implications of our current parameters for rationed health care.
Ultimately, a detailed analysis of Medicare’s foundations lies outside the scope
of this article as does any prediction regarding its extended future. Even a cursory
review of the complex issues that have helped to form today’s Medicare program
proves that defining the future of that program would be daunting at best.14 All too
and fifty-one percent higher total medical expenses incurred by those previously
uninsured)[hereinafter NIH]. See also J. Michael McWilliams et al., Use of Health Services
by Previously Uninsured Medicare Beneficiaries, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 143, 151 (2007)
(“Near-elderly adults who were uninsured required more intensive and costlier care in the
Medicare program after the age of sixty-five years than previously insured adults who were
otherwise similar at ages fifty-nine to sixty. Therefore, providing health insurance coverage
for uninsured near-elderly adults may improve their health outcomes and reduce their health
care use and spending after age sixty-five and that “these benefits may be substantial and may
partially offset the costs of expanding coverage.”).
10

See NATIONAL COALITION ON HEALTH CARE, supra note 8.

11

See DEMOCRATIC POLICY COMMITTEE, NUMBER OF UNINSURED AMERICANS INCREASES,
AGAIN (Sept. 6, 2005), http://democrats.senate.gov/dpc/dpc-printable.cfm?doc_name=fs-1091-85. See also Cathy Schoen et al., Insured But Not Protected: How Many Adults are
Underinsured?, HEALTH AFFAIRS (PROJECT HOPE), Jun. 14, 2005, at w5-299 (June 14, 2005)
(reporting that fifty-four percent of the underinsured and fifty-nine percent of the uninsured
describe going without needed medical care, that “having inadequate insurance as well as
being uninsured undermines access to care, satisfaction, and confidence in the quality of care
obtained,” and that “[a]ccess barriers reported by the underinsured at times approach rates
observed among uninsured adults.”).
12

NIH, supra note 9.

13

Id.

14

See Theodore Marmor, Medicare and Political Analysis: Omissions, Understandings,
and Misunderstandings, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1137, 1156 (2003).
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often, however, the ongoing debate regarding Medicare’s future reduces to an oversimplified balancing of economic forces alone, present and anticipated. After only
cursory examination, considerations of public policy increasingly fall to the side.
Without doubt, Medicare’s future will continue to be shaped by the tides of
economics, politics, and public policy. This article argues only for open
consideration of the implications of those resulting policies and how these will
reflect our society and its most enduring values.
II. PAYING FOR HEALTH CARE IN THE UNITED STATES
Technological advances, a growing elderly population and increasing public
expectations have worked together to increase the cost of health care.15 With rising
costs has come the question of how to afford the health care we need. In the private
sector, commercial insurance plans have relied on managed care models to ration
health care services which utilize a combination of explicit rationing, such as
limiting the range of reimbursable services, and implicit rationing, such as physician
discretion in allocating the resources available with respect to covered services. On
the other hand, government health plans have relied on stream-lining reimbursement
and have only recently begun to consider price-sharing and other forms of rationing
as a means of controlling escalating health care costs.16
A. A Brief History of Managed Care
Rationing may be defined in several ways. Webster’s dictionary defines
rationing as “to distribute equitably” or “to use sparingly.”17 Additionally, Webster’s
defines a ration as “a share especially as determined by supply.”18 We ration many
things in everyday life from determining monthly grocery budgets to allocating
available vacation time. In many instances, the idea of rationing evokes impressions
of self-restraint and preparedness for an uncertain future.
However, as a nation, we dislike the idea of rationing health care. When used in
the context of health care, rationing strikes an unpleasant chord in many of us and
often raises the unanswerable question – how much is life worth? Life is precious
and we would like to believe that we will implement any treatment that offers the
chance of preserving that life regardless of cost.19 Most of all, we would like to
believe that we live in a society that does not ration health care and that the absence

15
See David Mechanic, Professional Judgment and the Rationing of Medical Care, 140 U.
PA. L. REV. 1713, 1713 (1992) (discussing several approaches to health care rationing in the
private sector including “cost-sharing with patients (price rationing); administrative limits on
technological expansion, reimbursable services, and provider remuneration (explicit
rationing); and discretionary allocation of services within the constraints of established
budgets (implicit rationing)”).
16

See Jonathan Oberlander, The Politics of Medicare Reform, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1095, 1102 (2003) (describing Medicare’s foundation as a public insurance program and
reflecting that “[t]he most compelling argument in favor of public medical insurance for the
elderly was that the market had failed to meet their needs”).
17

WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY (2005), available at http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/ rationing.

18

WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY (2005), available at http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/ ration.

19

Mechanic, supra note 15, at 1745 (discussing the “rule of rescue”).
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of rationing renders us one of the best health care systems in the world, regardless of
statistics that may suggest otherwise.20
In fact, Americans have been rationing health care for almost ninety years. In
1929, several hundred Oklahoma farmers and their families enrolled in a prepaid
health care plan under which routine patient care was administered for a
predetermined, prepaid flat fee.21 In 1933, Harold Hatch, an insurance agent,
proposed paying a flat, fixed fee in advance for the medical care of construction
workers building the Los Angeles Aqueduct in the Mojave Desert.22 The idea of
prepaid health care captured the imagination of Henry Kaiser who persuaded the
same physician to offer a similar service for construction workers building the Grand
Coulee Dam 5 years later.23
Continued technological advancements in the medical field fueled escalating
health care costs and spurred the Nixon administration to propose the development
of health maintenance organizations (HMOs) in 1971.24 The concept of managed
care continued to develop over the next few decades until the 1997 Balanced Budget
Act introduced managed care options to the Medicare market.25
Ultimately, prepaid health plans and managed care rationing reflect the often
unacknowledged reality that the cost of health care can easily spiral out of control.
Managed care represents an attempt to limit those costs while promising continued
delivery of some necessary health care services in the future.26 The introduction of
managed care plans into the Medicare program suggested for the first time that the
escalating health care costs faced by the elderly were no longer costs that our society
could afford to shoulder to the same degree as it had in the past; the cost of some
medical treatments would increasingly fall on individual Medicare beneficiaries.

20

See Stephen Ohlemacher, U.S. 42nd in Global Life Expectancy, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
(August 11, 2007), http://www.presstelegram.com/news/ci_6603357 (reporting that the United
States currently ranks forty-second internationally with respect to life expectancy and infant
mortality and that contributing factors include the country’s rising epidemic of obesity, the
lower life expectancy and increased infant mortality among African Americans, and the
absence of a national health insurance program). See also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, GLOBAL
POPULATION PROFILE: 2002 (March 22, 2004), http://www.census.gov/ipc/prod/wp02/tabA12.pdf.
21

See TUFTS MANAGED CARE INSTITUTE, A BRIEF HISTORY OF MANAGED CARE, (1998),
http://www.tmci.org/downloads/BriefHist.pdf [hereinafter Tufts].
22

Id.

23

Id. See also Kaiser Permanente Founding & History (2007), http://www.kaisersantarosa.
org/about/kaiser/history .
24

Tufts, supra note 21.

25

Oberlander, supra note 16, at 1121.

26

See Thomas R. McLean & Edward P. Richards, Health Care’s “Thirty Years War”: The
Origins and Dissolution of Managed Care, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 283, 285 (2004)
(declaring that “medicine is not a stable industry, and its development is shaped by economic
and political factors as much as by science. Medical insurance does not just pay for medical
care – it shapes the medical care delivery system, determines what treatments are developed,
and formulates our view of what constitutes medical care.”).
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B. The Founding of Medicare
The institution of Medicare represents far more than our nation’s attempt to fund
the health care needs of its elderly. Like commercial health insurance, its evolution
as an institution reflects changes in the economic current, public policy, and political
climate of this nation.27 Also like commercial health insurance, it “does not just pay
for medical care” but also impacts the future shape and continuing evolution of our
medical care delivery system, including the sort of technological advancements we
will seek and the expectations we will hold as a society about what constitutes
adequate health care.28 Certainly, Medicare’s current Byzantine architecture defies
any accurate analysis without some understanding of the societal forces that formed
it and the historical and political forces that continue to shape it.29
The idea of government-sponsored health insurance first drew national attention
in the 1930s.30 The Committee on Economic Security was formed by President
Franklin Roosevelt to draft a Social Security bill and included in its original report a
promise of some future national health care plan.31 A strong initial negative reaction
to the proposal prompted an eventual revision of this report, but the idea had already
taken hold, and vigorous debates followed on the issue of national health care.32
Even then, these debates polarized along the lines of socialized health care, an idea
which the American Medical Association strongly opposed, and continued adherence
to a private commercial insurance model, which, at that time, most often consisted of
fee-for-service payment.33
Proposals for a national health care system experienced significant setbacks when
many of its supporters suffered political defeats in the 1950s.34 This reversal of
political fortunes prompted many to propose restrictions on any eventual national
coverage that may be formed to an elderly sub-population alone.35 Finally, Social
Security added disability benefits to its coverage in 1956, easing the path to some
form of a limited national health care coverage program.36
In 1964, Lyndon B. Johnson won his bid for the presidency and brought into
office his concept of a “Great Society.”37 Liberal candidates won widespread
victories in the 1964 elections which temporarily quieted the continuing ideological

27

Marmor, supra note 14, at 1143.

28

McLean, supra note 26, at 285.

29

Marmor, supra note 14, at 1138.

30

See Twight, supra note 4, at 313 (proposing that initial forays into the idea of a national
health care coverage plan was inspired in part by “Bismarck’s 1883 program in Germany.”).
31

Id.

32

Id. at 315. See also Oberlander, supra note 16, at 1099.

33

Oberlander, supra note 16, at 1099.

34

Twight, supra note 4, at 315-16.

35

Id.

36

Id.

37

Id. at 313.
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debate over national health care.38 Rather than settling existing disagreements,
however, the enactment of the Medicare program in 1965 marked not only the birth
of national health care benefits in the United States but also continued the debate
over whether national health care was a matter of social justice or market
economics.39
As initially enacted, Medicare provided two types of benefits. Under Part A,
Medicare covered basic hospital costs for those over age sixty-five.40 These benefits
were later extended to apply to those with end-stage renal disease.41 Currently, Part
A covers in-patient hospital care for up to 150 days, home health care, hospice care,
and in-patient psychiatric care for a lifetime limit of 190 days.42 Part A is funded by
tax revenue placed into the Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund.43
Medicare Part B differs from Part A in three key ways. First, enrollment in Part
B is voluntary.44 Second, Part B benefits require the payment of a premium.45 Third,
Part B benefits cover primarily outpatient physician services, including some
outpatient rehabilitative services and some medical equipment needs.46 Part B is
funded by the Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Fund.47
Funding health care soon became a problem in both private and public arenas.
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, rising health care costs prompted commercial
insurers to offer managed care options alongside traditional fee-for-service plans,
and gradually managed care plans became the dominant available form of
commercial insurance.48 At the same time, rising health care costs resulted in
shortfalls in Medicare funding in the 1970s and 1980s that in turn prompted

38

Id. at 318. See also Oberlander, supra note 16, at 1099 (describing this “liberal
landslide” as helping to settle a “high-profile, ideological, and highly partisan political
contest” and led to “Medicare’s enactment . . . with a much broader scope and a more
generous benefit package than even program advocates had thought possible.”).
39

Lee, supra note 1, at 16-17.

40

42 U.S.C.A. § 1395c (West 2000).

41

Id. See Oberlander, supra note 16, at 1102-3 (discussing the initial ideological debate as
to whether Medicare should be fashioned as an adjunct to commercial insurance or take the
form of a public insurance program, its initial coverage limits which extended only to the
elderly, and the eventual addition of coverage for the disabled and those with end-stage renal
disease). See also Marmor, supra note 14, at 1151 (detailing key objections in Medicare’s
initial formulation and discussing how those objectives have remained largely unattained
beyond the general provision of health care coverage “for the elderly, the disabled, and those
suffering from renal failure.”).
42

42 U.S.C.A. § 1395d (West 2000).

43

42 U.S.C.A. § 1395i (West 2000).

44

42 U.S.C.A. § 1395o (West 2000).

45

42 U.S.C.A. § 1395r (West 2000).

46

42 U.S.C.A. § 1395k (West 2000).

47

42 U.S.C.A. § 1395t (West 2000).

48

Oberlander, supra note 16, at 1114.
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increased regulation of medical providers and a prospective fee payment schedule.49
Medicare remained a single-payor, public insurance program managing relatively
impressive cost savings with the instituted reforms.50
However, persistent, recurrent shortfalls in Medicare funding during the 1990s
resulted in far more upheaval.51 Discussions regarding the future of national health
care coverage in this country became increasingly polarized and echoed in many
ways the ideological debates of the 1950s and 1960s that had preceded the initial
enactment of the Medicare program.52 Medicare’s ballooning costs were perceived
as a key cause of the ever-deepening national deficit.53 Furthermore, concerns over
the impending retirement of the Baby Boomer generation raised specters of Medicare
trust fund insolvency in the near future.54 Controlling health care costs became a
fiscal imperative, and an increasingly conservative political landscape favored
allowing market forces a greater role in shaping the reform of the Medicare
program.55
49

Id. at 1104-05.

50

Id. at 1107. See also Robert Pear, Bush to Propose Curbing Growth in Medicare Cost,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2006, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/04/
politics/04budget.html (summarizing briefly the history of cutting Medicare costs in order to
forward a proposed budget plan). See also Amy Goldstein, 2007 Budget Favors Defense:
Medicare Takes Biggest Hit in $2.7 Trillion Plan, WASH. POST (Feb. 5, 2006) at AO1,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/04/AR20060204
01179.html (describing proposed future cuts in Medicare costs in order to eliminate the
national deficit by 2012). See also Robert Pear, Bush’s Medicare Budget Would Raise
Premiums, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2007), at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/
04/washington/04budget.html (reflecting on the continuing shift in Medicare policy whereby
an increasing percentage of incurred health care costs must be born by the individual Medicare
beneficiary, including the burden of rising Medicare premiums).
51

The increasing cost of funding Medicare and the subsequent shortfalls in that funding
would also prompt many to question the wisdom of continuing to provide such entitlements to
a select portion of our population at particular cost to rest of our society. See Robert H.
Binstock, Public Policies on Aging in the Twenty-First Century, 9 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV.
311, 312 (1998) (discussing Americans’ progression as a society from conceptualizing the
elderly during the New Deal and Great Society eras as dependent on societal support to more
recent stereotyping of the elderly as the country’s retirement “elite”). See also Joseph White,
(How) is Aging a Health Policy Problem?, 4 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 47, 47-49
(2004) (arguing that aging poses less of a threat to health care costs escalation than other
factors such as pension expenses and how to deliver necessary health care).
52

Oberlander, supra note 16, at 1108.

53

Id. at 1110.

54

Id. at 1112. See also CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC
OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2008-2017 (2007), http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdoc.cfm?index=7731
(stating that Baby Boomers will become eligible for Social Security benefits in 2008,
triggering an increase in Social Security spending and, by implication, Medicare spending
from four and one-half percent in 2008 to six and one-half percent by 2017 and arguing that
“[e]ither a substantial reduction in the growth of spending, a significant increase in tax
revenues relative to the size of the economy, or some combination of spending and revenue
changes will be necessary to promote the nation’s long-term fiscal stability.”).
55

Oberlander, supra note 16, at 1109.
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This tense political and national climate set the stage for the introduction of
managed care plans into the Medicare program. The 1997 Balanced Budget Act
proposed creating a new Medicare + Choice option that offered a range of managed
care options to Medicare beneficiaries.56 However, the plan failed to include a price
incentive or terms obligating private insurers to remain in the program even in the
case of net loss.57
Furthermore, Medicare + Choice plans lacked the necessary economic impetus
that had made managed care a relatively successful strategy in the private market.
“Managed competition seeks to control health care costs by having patients pay the
costs of choosing more expensive health plans that compete in a regulated private
market.”58 In the absence of defined contributions and the subsequent financial
pressure that would encourage Medicare beneficiaries to move out of the traditional
Medicare payor scheme, Medicare + Choice programs “lacked the key cost control
mechanism of managed competition.”59 Medicare’s first foray into managed care
failed to effectively bring into the Medicare arena cost-containment strategies from
the private sector in part because of the absence of similar competitive market forces
on which private insurers heavily relied.
After a brief fiscal rally, the pressures of escalating health care costs and a
worsening deficit again precipitated interest in Medicare reform as a crucial factor in
the national budget. Medicare reform emerged as an important factor in the 2000
election.60 Although only ranked fourth overall by voters, control of rising health
care costs in general and prescription drug costs in particular remained high-profile
issues in the 2004 election.61 Although supplemental insurance plans existed that
offered prescription coverage, their premiums were increasing rapidly. This increase
in supplemental insurance premiums in combination with rising Medigap62 premiums
and the increasingly palpable gap between Medicare’s absence of outpatient
prescription coverage and the standard coverage already available in the private
sector set the stage for the introduction of a national prescription drug coverage
program and, with it, increasing the role of privatization in Medicare’s public
insurance program.63
56

Id. at 1121.

57

Id. at 1126-27.

58

Id. at 1123.

59

Id. at 1127.

60

Id. at 1128.

61

See Robert J. Blendon, Health Care in the 2004 Presidential Election, 351 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1314, 1314 (2004) (analyzing data from twenty-two national opinion surveys and
concluding that voters considered the cost of health care and prescription drugs, Medicare, and
the uninsured’s access to health care among the most concerning health care issues).
62

Medigap is supplemental health insurance sold by private insurance companies to help
pay costs that the individual’s Medicare plan would not otherwise cover. See Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services, Medicare Supplement Health Insurance Medigap Overview at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/Medigap (defining Medigap as a “policy is health
insurance sold by private insurance companies to fill the ‘gaps’in Original Medicare Plan
coverage.”).
63

Oberlander, supra note 16, at 1129-30.
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III. INTRODUCING THE MEDICARE MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003
Congress passed the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act (MMA) in 2003, incorporating prescription drug coverage
benefits into the Medicare program for the first time since its inception.64 The MMA
also heralded a striking change in the ideological mindset guiding Medicare policy in
that it promoted increased reliance on private sector insurers, and the efficiencies of
market economics on which they rely, to slow down Medicare’s rocketing costs.
The MMA created Medicare Part D which provides for voluntary enrollment in
one of several plans covering outpatient prescription drug costs.65 Under Part D,
private insurers offer prescription drug benefits to Medicare beneficiaries either
through Prescription Drug Plans in a traditional Medicare fee-for-service Part A and
B coverage plan or through Medicare Advantage plans under a Medicare Part C
managed care option.66 These private plans must provide coverage for drugs listed
under the established Medicare formulary.67 These private plans may include
additional drugs that exceed Medicare requirements within their chosen formularies
but may also cease coverage of these non-formulary medications without
forewarning the Medicare beneficiaries who have enrolled to receive prescription
drug coverage under their particular plan.68
For many, the proposed Part D coverage raised two immediate concerns. First,
the required Medicare formulary promised to be more restricted than many state
Medicaid formularies.69 However, Medicaid recipients would eventually be required
to enroll in Medicare prescription plans that would increase their drug costs while
decreasing their selection.70 Second, Part D’s payment scheme allowed for a
“doughnut hole” in coverage that would result in higher out-of-pocket expenses for
many beneficiaries. Under Part D as initially proposed, beneficiaries remained
responsible for the first $250 incurred in prescription drug costs.71 Part D would
64

Id. at 1133.

65

Susan Adler Channick, The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003: Will It Be Good Medicine for U.S. Health Policy?, 14 ELDER L. J.
237, 246 (2006).
66

See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395w-101 (West 2006). See also Channick, supra, note 64, at 237
(describing the basic coverage structure provided for under the MMA).
67
See THE CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONAL’S
PART D FACT SHEET, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MLNProducts/downloads/Part_D_Resource_
Fact_sheet_revised.pdf (including under covered drugs “[s]ix drug classes of special concern .
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cover seventy-five percent of the next $2000 of incurred prescription drug costs.72
The beneficiary would then bear the full burden of further drug costs until the
beneficiary’s total out-of-pocket costs (not simply costs charged) exceeded $3600.73
Past that point, Part D would pay ninety-five percent of any additional prescription
drug costs incurred.74
Although supplemental “doughnut hole” coverage is available, coverage under
such plans would generally be limited to generic drugs only and would come at a
considerable premium.75 Furthermore, should a Medicare beneficiary elect not to
enroll for Part D benefits when first eligible, that beneficiary would be subject to a
late enrollment penalty of one percent of the beneficiary’s base premium.76 This
penalty may be waived if the beneficiary can show alternate prescription drug
coverage for the pertinent time period.77
The MMA marks a striking change in Medicare policy, most critically it brought
to life “the conservative vision of Medicare as a competitive market in which the
federal government subsidizes beneficiaries to purchase private insurance.”78 Some
are concerned that the MMA signals “a clear commitment to the private market to
solve social problems.”79 Certainly, MMA and Medicare Part D introduce two
fundamental changes with respect to Medicare policy.
First, by mandating enrollment in Part D by those individuals with dual eligibility
for both Medicare and Medicaid benefits, Part D introduces a new level of
federalism into the mix of state and federal health care assistance programs.80
Congress enacted the Medicaid program in 1965 in a political climate that looked
favorably upon the idea of universal health insurance.81 Medicaid programs function
primarily at a state level with the individual states defining eligibility levels and
determining optional expansions, sometimes supported in their decisions by federal
72

42 U.S.C.A. § 1395w-102(b)(2)(A) (West 2006).

73

42 U.S.C.A. § 1395w-102(b)(4)(B) (West 2006).
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42 U.S.C.A. § 1395w-102(b)(4)(A)(i)(II) (West 2006). See also Channick, supra note
64, at 249-50 (explaining catastrophic coverage for prescription drugs and the impact of the
MMA on those eligible for both Medicare and Medicaid assistance).
75
See Christopher Lee, Group Says Gap in Medicare Drug Coverage Will Be Costly,
WASHINGTON POST (Nov. 2, 2006) at A11, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/11/01/AR2006110103324.html (referring to a Families USA report
that found that premiums for plans that included gap coverage would increase by as much as
eighty-seven percent and that such gap coverage may not be available at all in several states).
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mandates.82 State funds for many of these programs may be matched on occasion by
federal funds.83
However, the MMA requires that states contribute funds to the Part D
prescription benefit program for those seniors who previously received their drug
benefits under state Medicaid plans, and it also includes a complex formula to
determine the amount states must pay to the federal government as part of their Part
D contribution.84 The only factor within that formula that remains under state
control is the number of individuals meeting state eligibility criteria for dual
enrollment in both Medicaid and Medicare programs.85 As states confront worsening
budget crises of their own, this mandatory contribution to the Part D prescription
drug plan will likely result in notable retrenchment in eligibility requirements for
existing Medicaid programs.86
Second, by allowing private entities to negotiate drug pricing with
pharmaceutical companies and thereby define the tiered system by which
beneficiaries’ out-of-pocket expenses are determined, Part D fundamentally
redefines a government health care program’s method of reimbursement with respect
to private pharmaceutical companies.87 For example, the Veteran’s Affairs model
represents a more centralized public health care model in which a single government
entity, such as the Secretary of Veteran’s Affairs, negotiates directly with
pharmaceutical manufacturers to determine drug pricing.88
Although such a system has proven relatively successful in negotiating favorable
prescription drug prices for plan beneficiaries, the MMA implements a
“decentralized competitive pricing model” in which the private insurers providing
prescription drug coverage under Part D negotiate drug costs independently with
pharmaceutical manufacturers.89 Clearly, the hope would be that market forces
should ensure competitive drug pricing in such a setting; however, where a particular
drug lacks competition or is unique in its benefits, the decentralized system may not
afford significant cost-containment benefits.90
The MMA put into effect a federal prescription drug benefit program in response
to apparently high public demand for such benefits. However, the actual benefits of
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the Part D program may be mitigated by several factors including a limited
formulary; a sizeable “doughnut hole” in mid-coverage during which Part D
beneficiaries remain 100 percent responsible for out-of-pocket costs of prescribed
medications; potential cutbacks in Medicaid programs as a result of mandatory
contributions to the Part D program; and the mixed efficacy of a decentralized
competitive pricing model for negotiated drug costs.
IV. RATIONING HEALTH CARE UNDER MEDICARE
In the midst of these turbulent debates over the future of our existing national
health care program, a general consensus appears to exist on one issue alone:
Medicare cannot survive as it is currently structured. The Secretary of Health and
Human Services has stated that “Medicare is simply not sustainable in the long-term
in its present form” because of its persistently escalating costs.91 In discussing the
proposed 2008 Medicare budget, he stated that “[t]here will never be enough money
to satisfy all wants and needs, and we had to make some tough choices.”92 The issue
then is not if health care should be rationed, but how to best go about formulating a
plan of rationing and who should determine the ultimate allocation of our available
health care resources.
Rationing can take many forms. At least one attempt has been made to divide
potential methods of rationing into three specific approaches.93 These approaches
include cost-sharing with beneficiaries, administrative constraints on technological
expansion and remuneration for services (explicit rationing), and health provider
discretion in the allocation of services under an established budget (implicit
rationing).94 Explicit rationing includes administrative constraints on a particular
health care plan in an effort to limit expenditures under that plan, including precise
limitations on what treatment modalities may be covered.95 Implicit rationing relies
on the clinical relationship between physician and patient to streamline the health
care services a particular individual may require or should be offered.96 Under
implicit rationing, the physician exercises her professional discretion in determining
the health care options for which a particular patient may be considered.97
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See Michael Leavitt, Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services, Statement on
FY 2008 Budget before the Comm. on Appropriations, Subcomm. on Labor, Health &
Humans Services, Education, and Related Agencies, and the U.S. House of Representatives
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Both explicit and implicit rationing bring with them particular pitfalls. Repeated,
successful litigation against managed care entities has caused many private insurers
to shy away from the more explicit forms of health care rationing.98 As a result,
many private insurers now prefer to follow a more implicit model of rationing where
the physician serves as both patient advocate and resource administrator.99 Some
argue that the relationship between physician and patient includes a unique bond of
trust that can withstand the dual role that physicians would fill under an implicit
rationing model.100 However, others have argued that the bond of trust between
physician and patient is not so resilient as to allow a persistent reliance on this
duality.101
Current efforts to curb Medicare expenditure have focused on three potentially
cost-saving measures. First, efforts to improve national health information
technology continue to receive broad-ranging support under the assumption that
increased efficiency in this area will translate into general cost savings.102 Second,
efforts to reduce health care fraud and abuse continue to be viewed as a potentially
major source of savings.103 Third, expanding on the initial forays into privatization
under Medicare Part D may also provide further, much-needed savings.104
Introducing privatization into a public insurance program poses several important
questions, however. As first enacted, Medicare functioned as a form of national
health insurance.105 Payment collected through tax revenues or voluntary premiums
were in turn meted out through a government plan.106 Although including private
insurers in the program allows for some shifting of health care costs to the
beneficiary as well as the private sector, the continued success of the program will
likely still require some government funding to ensure continued private sector
participation. As demonstrated by the failed Medicare + Choice program, the
inevitable escalation of health care costs demands that the government provide some
incentive for private insurers to remain in the business of providing health care
98
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benefits to the elderly, a sub-population that is already more likely to utilize
available health care resources.107 As such, funding Part D promises to continue
being a challenge.
Part D also presents a risk of increasing the number of uninsured or underinsured
Americans. The convoluted Part D benefits system has already proven difficult for
many beneficiaries to navigate.108 These beneficiaries may become underinsured or
uninsured under the Medicare program either because they are bewildered by the
choices before them, unclear as to what benefits their Medicare plan actually affords
them, or simply unable to afford the additional coverage they now require to provide
the coverage they initially expected under Part D.
Finally, Part D may be premised on a comforting but inaccurate assumption –
that private sector market economics provides a more efficient paradigm under
which to allocate health care resources. The private sector suffered greater losses
during the initial eras of managed care than did Medicare under its policy of
streamlined reimbursement and increased administrative controls.109 Furthermore,
private, commercial insurance costs continue to rise, pricing themselves out of the
market for many Americans and resulting in an escalating number of uninsured or
underinsured citizens.110 In turn, that lapse in health care coverage has resulted in an
increased burden on the Medicare system.111
Increasingly, personal resources determine access to health care. With the
gradual erosion of services provided under public insurance programs, those who
depend on those services and whose personal resources do not allow them to seek
health care in the private market are often left not seeking essential health care when
necessary.112 However, those with greater personal resources may obtain a better
quality of health care through an emerging market of more personalized health care
delivery systems such as concierge medicine.113 In the end, the private health care
insurance market has ensured a system where the more prosperous Americans are
able to live longer lives, in better health, simply because they have the money to
afford to do so. Reliance on such a system as a means of supporting the health care
needs of the elderly in our society promises to be worrisome at best.

107
See Alexander R. Shekhdar, Strategic Choices for Managed Care Plans Under the
Modernization Act of 2003, 37 J. HEALTH L. 429, 431 (2004).
108

See Oberlander, supra note 17, at 1097 (discussing the implications for Medicare with
the retirement of the “baby boom generation”).
109

White, supra note 52, at 53.

110

CBPP, supra note 8.

111

McWilliams, supra note 10, at 151.

112

Schoen, supra note 12.

113

See Sandra J. Carnahan, Law, Medicine, and Wealth: Does Concierge Medicine
Promote Health Care Choice, or Is It a Barrier to Access?, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 121,
154 (2006) (stating that “[o]verall access to medical care in a community may be
compromised when a physician converts to a retainer practice that serves a patient panel now
reduced by as many as 2500 patients” but also noting that existing data does not suggest that
these physicians are less likely to provide indigent care and that they may even be in a better
position to do so than many of their colleagues).

44

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

[Vol. 21:29

Currently, our national health care policy appears to have been dictated by the
winds of the prevailing political climate and relatively short-term economic
considerations. The absence of any enduring guiding principle to our health care
agenda has resulted in an arcane system that appears impossible to meaningfully
comprehend and even more impossible to reform in a productive fashion. Most
health care reform proposals either propose unrealistically that we start the system
over from scratch or appear unbelievable in their Byzantine architecture as
necessitated by the existing intricacies of our Medicare network.114
Privatization of our existing system may promise short-term relief of our current
cost concerns. However, it also promises to potentially curtail access to basic health
care services without a burdensome drain on beneficiaries’ personal resources, a
drain that many beneficiaries may not be able to afford.115 Although such costsharing may appear reasonable at first glance, its long-term effects may include
reduced access to care for some of our most vulnerable citizens who currently rely
on government-subsidized health care programs, particularly the disabled and the
elderly, especially elderly women whose life expectancy continues to exceed their
male counterparts.116 In the end, cost containment through privatization of existing
government-subsidized programs may come at the price of increasing socioeconomic
stratification within our society through rationing access to health care, arguably one
of our most fundamental needs.
V. CONCLUSION
The continuing debate over national health care raises several critical questions.
Is access to health care a right? Should the quality of an individual’s health care be
dictated by socioeconomic standing? Do we as a society bear any responsibility for
ensuring equal access to existing health care resources?
Our answers to these questions will define our culture and reflect what we value
most as a society. How we choose to address these issues of national health care
policy promises to become our most enduring legacy, both to future generations in
our country as well as to the world at large. We should not allow these answers to be
dictated by narrow economic considerations alone. We must confront these
questions with full acknowledgment of their ideological ramifications and not allow
ourselves the luxury of oversimplification.
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